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Abstract
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes allow a user to retrieve a record
from the server without revealing any information on which record is being down-
loaded. In this paper, we consider PIR schemes where the database is stored using
Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) codes which is a class of optimal regener-
ating codes providing efficient repair when a node failure occurs in the system. We
analyse the relationship between the costs of privacy, storage and repair, and also
construct an explicit PIR scheme that uses the MSR codes from [3] to achieve the
optimal curve of the trade-off.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes allow a user to download a record from
the database without revealing any information on which record the user wants to re-
trieve. In the classical setting for PIR [1], the entire database is replicated among n
non-communicating nodes. Since the replication-based PIR results in high storage cost,
this motivates the use of erasure codes which means that each node stores only a fraction
of the entire database, hence reducing the storage cost while achieving reliability. We call
this code-based PIR schemes.
Shah et al. [2] are the first to explore the work on coded databases. They give an
explicit PIR scheme where only one extra bit of download is sufficient to retrieve the
desired record. However, this construction requires the number of nodes in the system
to be exponential in the number of records. As the result of the exponential storage
cost, they provide another PIR scheme using the product-matrix Minimum Bandwidth
Regenerating (MBR) codes [3]. The storage overhead in this scheme is linear and the
total download is just a small factor away from optimality.
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In [4], Chan et al. propose retrieval schemes for a general class of linear storage
codes, and the trade-off between storage cost and retrieval cost in the context of their
proposed PIR schemes is analysed. Subsequently in [5], Tajeddine and Rouayheb give an
explicit PIR scheme using MDS codes which achieves the optimal retrieval cost for linear
schemes ([4]). Kumar et al. [6] show that an arbitrary systematic linear storage code
of rate > 1/2 can be used in the PIR scheme, and, interestingly, numerical results show
that the optimal PIR protocal can be achieved by using locally repairable codes (LRCs)
[7] and Pyramid codes [8] which have more efficient repair property. In [9], Banawan and
Ulukus consider the problem of capacity - the maximum of the retrieval rates over all
possible PIR schemes. They analyse the capacity of the PIR scheme using MDS codes as
in [5] which improves the results in [4] and [5] and gives the best-known upper bound on
the retrieval rate.
In this paper, we consider the PIR problem in coded databases. Specifically, we
consider the situation where the database is stored using minimum storage regenerating
(MSR) codes ([3]). The interesting property of regenerating codes is that such codes
optimally trade the bandwidth needed to repair a failed node with the storage overhead,
hence our scheme obtains a lower repair cost compared to schemes that use MDS codes.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly recall the product-
matrix Minimum Storage Regenerating codes from [3]. Section 3 provides the system
model of PIR scheme using product-matrix MSR codes. The decodability condition and
trade-off analysis between the storage cost and the retrieval cost in the system are given
in Section 4. Section 5 then presents a motivating example and the general construction
of our PIR scheme. Lastly, we discuss the efficiency of our scheme in Section 6.
2 Product-Matrix MSR Codes
2.1 Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) Codes
An (n, k, r, α, β, B) regenerating code [10] is defined to be a distributed storage code
storing the database of size B among n nodes where each node stores α symbols satisfying
two properties: (i)(recovery) The entire database can be recovered from the data stored in
any k nodes; (ii)(repair) If one of the storage nodes fails, then a newcomer node connects
to some set of r remaining nodes where k < r < n, and downloads β symbols from each
of these r nodes in order to regenerate α symbols in such a way that we can perform (i)
and (ii) again when another node failure occurs.
The total amount of rβ symbols downloaded for regenerating is called the repair band-
width, and typically the repair bandwidth is smaller than the size of the whole database.
There are various repair models, but for PIR we focus on the exact repair model, where
a newcomer node will regenerate the same data as was stored in the failed node in order
to maintain the initial state of the storage nodes.
In [11], the parameters of a regenerating code is shown to necessarily satisfy
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (r − i)β},
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and the achievable trade-off between storage overhead and repair bandwidth is charac-
terised by fixing the repair bandwidth, and then deriving the minimum α which satisfies
the above equation. An interesting extremal point on the optimal trade-off curve is the
minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point which minimises storage overhead first and
then minimises repair bandwidth. It can be shown that the MSR point is achieved by
(αMSR, βMSR) =
(
B
k
,
B
k(r − k + 1)
)
,
and MSR codes are (n, k, r, α, β, B) regenerating codes that satisfies the above equation.
2.2 The Product-Matrix MSR Codes ([3])
Under the product-matrix framework, each codeword is represented by an (n × α) code
matrix C which is the product
C = Ψ ·M
of an (n× r) encoding matrix Ψ and an (r×α) message matrix M . The message matrix
M contains the B message symbols. In the code matrix C, row i consists of the α encoded
symbols stored by node i for each i ∈ [n].
In [3], Rashmi, Shah and Kumar give an explicit construction for the MSR code with
r = 2k−2, so the parameters are (n, k, r, α, β, B) = (n, k, 2k−2, k−1, 1, k(k−1)) where
n > 2k − 2 using the product-matrix framework. First, they let the encoding matrix Ψ
be any (n× r) matrix given by
Ψ =
[
Φ ΛΦ
]
where Φ is an (n × α) matrix and Λ is an (n × n) diagonal matrix such that (i) any r
rows of Ψ are linearly independent, (ii) any α rows of Φ are linearly independent, (iii)
the n diagonal elements of Λ are all distinct. The rows of Ψ are denoted by Ψi, i ∈ [n].
Next, the (r × α) message matrix M is defined as
M =
[
S1
S2
]
where S1 and S2 are (α×α) symmetric matrices constructed such that
(
k
2
)
entries in the
upper-triangular part of each matrix are filled up by
(
k
2
)
distinct message symbols and
entries in the strictly lower-triangular are chosen to make the matrices symmetric. This
is the MSR code we will use for our PIR scheme.
3 System Model
Here we formally describe the storage model and its retrieval scheme. Consider a storage
system with n non-colluding nodes that store a database X consisting of m records, each
of length ℓ = k(k − 1), denoted by X1, X2, . . . , Xm ∈ Fℓq. Each record is encoded and
distributed across n nodes using the same product-matrix MSR code with parameters
(n, k, r, α, β, B) = (n, k, r, r − k + 1, 1, k(r − k + 1)),
3
i.e. record Xj is encoded by
Cj = Ψ ·Mj
where Mj is the corresponding message matrix of Xj . Write
M =
[
M1 · · · Mm
]
,
and denote by Mi the row i of M. Hence, the whole system is
C =
[
C1 · · · Cm
]
=
[
Ψ ·M1 · · · Ψ · Mm
]
= Ψ ·M
which means that each node stores mα = m(k − 1) symbols in total, and we denote by
Ci the row i of C which consists of all symbols stored in node i, and C
j
i the row i of C
j
which consists of all symbols of Xj stored in node i.
For the retrieval step, suppose the user wants to retrieve the record Xf . The user
submits a d ×mα query matrix Qi over GF (q) to node i, which we can think of d rows
of Qi as d subqueries submitted to node i. In our scheme and in [5], for example, d is set
to be k. Then node i responds with an answer ATi = Q
iCTi . The retrieval steps are as
follows:
(i) (Initialisation) The user genarates an d×mα matrix U whose elements are chosen
independently and uniformly at random over GF (q). Let Uj be row j of U .
(ii) (Query Generation) The query matrices are defined by a d× nα matrix
V =
[
V 1 · · · V n
]
where V i is a d × α binary matrix for i ∈ [n]. The request to each node h is an
d×mα matrix
Qh = U + V hEf
where
Ef =
[
0α×(f−1)α Iα×α 0α×(m−f)α
]
.
In other words, Ef is an α×mα matrix such that Ch(E
f)T = Cfh which is a coded
data piece of the desired record Xf stored in node h. If the entry (a, b) of V h is 1,
then it implies that the entry Cfhb is privately retrieved by the a
th subquery of Qh.
(iii) (Response Mappings) Each node h returns ATh = Q
hCTh .
Let H(·) be the entropy function. We say that a scheme is a perfect information-theoretic
PIR scheme if
1. (i)(privacy) H(f |Qi) = H(f) for every i ∈ [n];
2. (ii)(decodability) H(Xf |A1, . . . , An) = 0.
According to our definition, (i) means that a node i gets no information about which
records are being retrieved by the user, and (ii) implies that having all responses Ai from
each node i ensures that the user is able to recover the desired records Xf with no errors.
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Two measurements are usually used to analyse the efficiency of the PIR scheme. First,
Storage Overhead (SO) is defined to be the ratio of the total storage used in the scheme
to the total size of the entire database which, in our model, is
SO = n(mα)/mkα = n/k.
In fact, storage overhead is the reciprocal of code rate. Second, the communication Price
of Privacy (cPoP) of a PIR scheme, which is defined in [5], is the ratio of the total amount
of downloaded data to the total size of all desired records which, in our model, is
cPoP = dn/kα.
In this paper, we also consider the metric called the repair ratio (RR) which is defined
to be the ratio of the total amount of symbols downloaded for repairing a failed node to
the size of the failed node which is equal to
mr/mα = r/(r − k + 1)
in our model.
4 Decodability Condition and Trade-off Analysis
From the retrieval scheme, we can see that in fact, the response from node i is
Ai = Ci(Q
i)T
= Ci[U
T + (Ef)T (V i)T ]
= CiU
T + Ci(E
f )T (V i)T
= CiU
T + (Cfi )(V
i)T .
Then, the jth response in Ai is Aij = Ci(Uj)
T + Cfi (V
i
j )
T where V ij is the row j of V
i.
Hence, record Xf should be decoded by solving the system of linear equations
Aij = Ci(Uj)
T + Cfi (V
i
j )
T ,
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d] where the unknowns are
(Ci(Uj)
T , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], Cfab, a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α]).
Consider first the unknowns Ci(Uj)
T , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], we can see that for each j ∈ [d],
C(Uj)
T = Ψ · M · (Uj)
T
= Ψ ·
[
Ij1 · · · I
j
r
]T
where Ijh =Mh · (Uj)
T , h ∈ [r]. For the unknowns Cfab, a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α], we know that
Cfab = the entry (a, b) of Ψ · M
j, ∀a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α].
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Hence, the retrieval scheme is decodable if the following system of linear equations

Aij = Ci(Uj)
T + Cfi (V
i
j )
T , ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d]
Cs(Ut)
T = Ψs ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
, ∀s ∈ [n], t ∈ [d]
Cfab = the entry (a, b) of C
f , ∀a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α]
has a unique solution, where the unknowns are
(Ci(Uj)
T , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], Cfab, a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α]).
This condition is called decodability condition.
Next, we will give the trade-off analysis between storage overhead and cPoP. First,
we count the number of unknowns in the system of linear equations in the decodability
condition which is equal to nd+ nα. Next, we count the number of linearly independent
equations in the system. Consider
Cs(Ut)
T = Ψs ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
, ∀s ∈ [n], t ∈ [d],
so we have, for each t ∈ [d],
C(Ut)
T = Ψ ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
.
Since Ψ is of rank r, it has a parity check matrix P of rank n − r such that P · Ψ = 0.
So we have
P · C(Ut)
T = P ·Ψ ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
= 0.
This gives us n− r linearly independent equations for each t ∈ [d]. Then, for
Cfab = the entry (a, b) of C
f , ∀a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α],
since any k rows of Cf would give us Mf , the remaining n − k rows must be able to
be written in terms of linear combinations of those k rows of Cf . This give us (n − k)α
equations in Cfab. Hence, there are at most nd+ (n− r)d+ (n− k)α linearly independent
equations in the system. If the retrieval scheme meets the decodability condition, then
nd+ nα ≤ nd+ (n− r)d+ (n− k)α,
which implies that
kα ≤ (n− r)d.
Therefore,
1 ≤
dn
kα
(
1−
r
n
)
.
In terms of storage overhead and cPoP we have
1 ≤ cPoP
(
1−
r
k(SO)
)
.
This shows that there is a trade-off between cPoP and storage overhead, and in terms of
repair ratio and cPoP we have
1 ≤ cPoP − RR
(
d
k
)
.
This shows that cPoP is bounded below by repair ratio.
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5 Our Construction
In this construction, we use the product-matrix MSR code from [3] with n = 3k−3, over
the finite field Fq, so the parameters of the MSR code are
(n, k, r, α, β, B) = (3k − 3, k, 2k − 2, k − 1, 1, k(k − 1)).
We adapt the retrieval technique from the PIR schemes using MDS codes [5] to our
storage which uses the MSR codes where the desired record Xf can be recovered from
the coded data piece stored in any k nodes, and we also make use of the repair property.
We first start with an example to motivate our scheme.
Example 1. Suppose that we have 3 records over the finite field F13, each with size 6,
which can be written as
X i = {xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4, xi5, xi6}, for i = 1, 2, 3.
We use a (6, 3, 4, 2, 1, 6) product-matrix MSR code over F13 to encode each record by
choosing the encoding matrix Ψ to be the Vandermonde matrix, and the message matrix
Mi for the record i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} as described in [3]:
Ψ =


1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 9 3 12 10
1 8 1 12 8 8


T
, Mi =


xi1 xi2
xi2 xi3
xi4 xi5
xi5 xi6

 .
Hence, each node stores
node 1 node 2 node 3
x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 x11 + 2x12 + 4x14 + 8x15 x11 + 3x12 + 9x14 + x15
x12 + x13 + x15 + x16 x12 + 2x13 + 4x15 + 8x16 x12 + 3x13 + 9x15 + x16
x21 + x22 + x24 + x25 x21 + 2x22 + 4x24 + 8x25 x21 + 3x22 + 9x24 + x25
x22 + x23 + x25 + x26 x22 + 2x23 + 4x25 + 8x26 x22 + 3x23 + 9x25 + x26
x31 + x32 + x34 + x35 x31 + 2x32 + 4x34 + 8x35 x31 + 3x32 + 9x34 + x35
x32 + x33 + x35 + x36 x32 + 2x33 + 4x35 + 8x36 x32 + 3x33 + 9x35 + x36
node 4 node 5 node 6
x11 + 4x12 + 3x14 + 12x15 x11 + 5x12 + 12x14 + 8x15 x11 + 6x12 + 10x14 + 8x15
x12 + 4x13 + 3x15 + 12x16 x12 + 5x13 + 12x15 + 8x16 x12 + 6x13 + 10x15 + 8x16
x21 + 4x22 + 3x24 + 12x25 x21 + 5x22 + 12x24 + 8x25 x21 + 6x22 + 10x24 + 8x25
x22 + 4x23 + 3x25 + 12x26 x22 + 5x23 + 12x25 + 8x26 x22 + 6x23 + 10x25 + 8x26
x31 + 4x32 + 3x34 + 12x35 x31 + 5x32 + 12x34 + 8x35 x31 + 6x32 + 10x34 + 8x35
x32 + 4x33 + 3x35 + 12x36 x32 + 5x33 + 12x35 + 8x36 x32 + 6x33 + 10x35 + 8x36
Recall that Caij is the j
th symbol of record a, stored in node i. Here the entire database
can be recovered from the content of any 3 nodes, and if any one node failed, it can be
repaired by downloading one symbol each from 4 of the remaining nodes.
In the retrieval step, suppose the user wants record X1. The query Qi is a (3 × 6)
matrix which we can interpret as 3 subqueries submitted to node i for each i ∈ [6]. To
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form the query matrices, the user generates a (3 × 6) random matrix U = [uij] whose
entries are chosen uniformly at a random from F13. Choose
V 1 =

1 00 1
0 0

 , V 2 =

0 01 0
0 1

 , V 3 =

0 10 0
1 0

 , V 4 = V 5 = V 6 = 03×2.
As
E1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
]
,
we have
V 1E1 =

1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

 , V 2E1 =

0 0 0 0 0 01 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0

 , V 3E1 =

0 1 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0

 ,
and
V 4E1 = V 5E1 = V 6E1 = 03×6.
The query matrices are Qi = U + V iE1, i ∈ [6]. Then each node computes and returns
the length-3 vector ATi = Q
iCTi . Write Ai = (Ai1, Ai2, Ai3). Recall that
M1 = (x11, x12, x21, x22, x31, x32),
M2 = (x12, x13, x22, x23, x32, x33),
M3 = (x14, x15, x24, x25, x34, x35),
M4 = (x15, x16, x25, x26, x35, x36).
Consider first subquery 1, we obtain
C111 + I
1
1 + I
1
2 + I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A11, (1)
I11 + 2I
1
2 + 4I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A21, (2)
C132 + I
1
1 + 3I
1
2 + 9I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A31, (3)
I11 + 4I
1
2 + 3I
1
3 + 12I
1
4 = A41, (4)
I11 + 5I
1
2 + 12I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A51, (5)
I11 + 6I
1
2 + 10I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A61, (6)
where I1h =Mh · U
T
1 , h = 1, 2, 3, 4, and U1 is the first row of U .
The user can solve for I11 , I
1
2 , I
1
3 , I
1
4 from (2), (4), (5), (6) as they form the equation

1 2 4 8
1 4 3 12
1 5 12 8
1 6 10 8

 ·


I11
I12
I13
I14

 =


A21
A41
A51
A61


where the left matrix is the (4×4) submatrix of Ψ which is invertible. Therefore, the user
gets C111 and C
1
32. Similarly, from subqueries 2, 3, the user obtains C
1
12, C
1
21 and C
1
22, C
1
31,
respectively. Hence, the user has all the symbols of X1 which are stored in the first k = 3
nodes. From the recovery property of the regenerating code, the user can reconstruct X1
as desired.
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node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5 node 6
1 2 3
2 3 1
Table 1: Retrieval pattern for a (6, 3, 4, 2, 1, 6) MSR code. The α×n entries
correspond to (Cf )T and the entries labelled by the same number, say d, are
privately retrieved by subquery d.
Now we will give the general PIR scheme of our construction and prove the decod-
ability and privacy. Recall that we use the MSR code with parameters
(n, k, r, α, β, B) = (3k − 3, k, 2k − 2, k − 1, 1, k(k − 1))
over Fq to store each record X
1, . . . , Xm, which means that
C i = Ψ ·Mi
where Mi is the message matrix corresponding to X i as described in [3], so
C =
[
Ψ · M1 · · · Ψ · Mm
]
.
Suppose that the user wants record Xf . In the retrieval step, the user sends a (k ×mα)
query matrix Qi, which we can interpret as k subqueries, to each node i, i = 1, . . . , n. To
form the query matrices, the user generates a (k ×mα) random matrix U = [uij] whose
entries are chosen uniformly at a random from Fq. We choose
V 1 =
[
I(k−1)×(k−1)
01×(k−1)
]
and V j , j = 2, . . . , k is obtained from matrix V j−1 by a single downward cyclic shift of
its row vectors. For i = k + 1, . . . , n, we choose V i = 0k×(k−1). As
Ef =
[
0α×(f−1)α Iα×α 0α×(m−f)α
]
,
we have
V 1Ef =
[
0k×(f−1)α
I(k−1)×(k−1)
01×(k−1)
0k×(m−f)α
]
and V jEf , j = 2, . . . , k is obtained from matrix V j−1Ef by a single downward cyclic shift
of its row vectors. For i = k + 1, . . . , n, we have V i = 0k×mα. The query matrices are
Qi = U + V i, i ∈ [n]. Then, each node computes and returns the length-k ATi = QiC
T
i ,
and we write Ai = (Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aik).
Decodability: The following proof will show the decodability of this scheme. We can
see that for i = 1, . . . , n,
Ci = Ψi · M
= Ψi ·


−−−− M1 −−−−
−−−− M2 −−−−
...
−−−− M2k−2 −−−−


=
2k−2∑
j=1
ΨijMj
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Thus,
CTi =
2k−2∑
j=1
ΨijM
T
j .
Consider first subquery 1, we obtain
Cf1,(f−1)α+1 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ1jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f−1)α+1)C
T
1 = A11, (1)
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ2jI
1
j = U1C
T
2 = A21, (2)
Cf3,(f−1)α+k−1 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ3jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f−1)α+k−1)C
T
3 = A31, (3)
Cf4,(f−1)α+k−2 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ4jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f−1)α+k−2)C
T
4 = A41, (4)
...
...
Cf
k,(f−1)α+2 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψk,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f−1)α+2)C
T
k = Ak,1, (k)
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψk+1,jI
1
j = U1C
T
k+1 = Ak+1,1, (k+1)
...
...
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψn,j, I
1
j = U1C
T
n = An,1, (n)
where I1h =Mh ·U
T
1 , h = 1, 2, . . . , 2k−2, U1 is the first row of U , and et is the length-mα
binary unit vector with 1 at the tth position.
The user can solve for I11 , . . . , I
1
2k−2 from (2), (k+1), . . . , (n) as they form the equation

−−−− Ψ2 −−−−
−−−− Ψk+1 −−−−
...
−−−− Ψn −−−−

 ·


I11
I12
...
I12k−2

 =


A21
Ak+1,1
...
An,1


where, since n = 3k − 3, the left matrix is ((2k − 2) × (2k − 2)) square submatrix of Ψ
which is invertible by the construction. Note that here we in fact make use of the repair
property of the code, which requires r × r submatrices to be invertible. Therefore, the
user gets
Cf1,(f−1)α+1, C
f
3,(f−1)α+k−1, C
f
4,(f−1)α+k−2, . . . , C
f
k,(f−1)α+2,
i.e., all the symbols with label 1 in Table 2. Similarly, from subqueries i = 2, . . . , k, the
user obtains all the symbols with label i in Table 2. Hence, the user has all the symbols of
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Xf which are stored in the first k nodes. From the recovery property of the regenerating
code, the user can finally reconstruct Xf as desired.
Privacy: As we construct the query matrices Qi via the random matrix U , Qi is
independent from f which implies that this scheme achieves perfect privacy.
node 1 node 2 node 3 · · · node k − 1 node k node k + 1 · · · node n
1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k
2 3 4 · · · k 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
k − 2 k − 1 k · · · k − 4 k − 3
k − 1 k 1 · · · k − 3 k − 2
Table 2: Retrieval pattern
6 Discussion and Future Work
In our PIR scheme, storage overhead is
n
k
=
3k − 3
k
,
and cPoP equals to
dn
kα
=
k(3k − 3)
k(k − 1)
= 3,
Hence,
cPoP
(
1−
r
k(SO)
)
= 3
(
1−
2k − 2
3k − 3
)
= 3
(
1−
2
3
)
= 1.
This means that our scheme achieves the information theoritic limit as it fits the optimal
curve in the trade-off derived in Section 4.
Also, as we use the MSR codes in our construction which beneficially reduces the
repair cost when a node failure occurs in the system, repair ratio in our scheme is
r
α
=
(2k − 2)
k − 1
= 2,
which is smaller than PIR schemes that use (n, k)-MDS codes (for example, in [5]) where
the repair ratio equals to k if k > 2.
We remark that a similar construction still works for product-matrix minimum band-
width regenerating (MBR) codes with some adjustment which we will publish later.
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Also, the construction of schemes using this retrieval technique for the Multi-message
PIR, which is a variation of PIR that allows a user to download multiple messages from
the database without revealing the identity of the desired messages, is achievable and
we will present this at the 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT) at the Recent Results Session.
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